In order to avoid the paradoxes of standard deontic logic, we have to give up the semantic construction that identifies obligatory status with presence in all elements of a subset of the set of possible worlds. It is proposed that deontic logic should instead be based on a preference relation, according to the principle that whatever is better than something permitted is itself permitted. Close connections hold between the logical properties of a preference relation and those of the deontic logics that are derived from it in this way. The paradoxes of SDL can be avoided with this construction, but it is still an open question what type of preference relation is best suited to be used as a basis for deontic logic.
Introduction
Modern deontic logic began with a seminal paper by Georg Henrik von Wright in 1951. 1 With a minor modification, 2 his list of postulates has turned out to be characterizable by a simple semantical construction that has since then dominated the subject: It is assumed that there is a subset of the set of possible worlds (the "ideal worlds") such that for any sentence p, Op (meaning that p is obligatory) holds if and only if p holds in all of these worlds. This is standard deontic logic (SDL); its basic principle is illustrated in Diagram 1.
The term "possible world" is ambiguous. In a logical sense, a possible world is a maximal consistent subset of the sentences of a given language. In a metaphysical sense, a possible world is a complete description of how the world could be. The holistic alternatives used in the SDL semantics have to be possible worlds in a logical sense, but not 1 von Wright 1951. On the origins of deontic logic, see Føllesdal and Hilpinen 1970 and von Wright 1998. necessarily in a metaphysical sense. They can, for instance, represent the combinations of actions that are open to an individual (rather than the worlds that she might inhabit). In order to avoid confusion with metaphysical possible worlds, I will use the terms "holistic alternative" and "alternative" instead of "possible world".
The valid sentences of SDL coincide with the theorems derivable from the following three axioms:
Op → ¬O¬p,
Op & Oq ↔ O(p&q), and O(p∨¬p).

3
It is common to assume that the selection of alternatives shown in Diagram 1 is based on an ordering of the alternatives, as in Diagram 2. The ideal alternatives are then identified with the maximal (best) alternatives according to that ordering. This construction makes it possible to extend SDL to conditional norms. In order to determine what obligations hold if s is true, we just restrict our attention to alternatives in which s is true, and identify the ideal alternatives with the alternatives that are best (maximal) in this restricted set. (Diagram 3) SDL semantics is admirably simple and elegant. Unfortunately, it forces us to rather implausible conclusions. If we identify obligatory status with presence in all elements of a certain subset of the alternative set, then the following property will invariably hold:
This property has many names. I prefer to call it necessitation since it says that whatever is necessitated by a moral requirement is itself a moral requirement. As an example, suppose that I am morally required to take a boat without the consent of its owner and use it to rescue a drowning person. Let p denote this composite action that I am required to perform, and let q denote the part of it that consists in taking the boat without leave.
Since q follows logically from p, I am logically necessitated to perform q in order to perform p. According to the postulate of necessitation, I then have an obligation to q. This is contestable, since I have no obligation to q in isolation.
Necessitation gives rise to most of the major deontic paradoxes. We may call these the necessitation paradoxes. Four of the most prominent are It is the purpose of the present presentation to show how we can save deontic logic from the necessitation paradoxes. In order to achieve this we will have to give up the basic semantic idea of SDL, and hopefully find some other, more plausible semantic principle for deontic logic.
The subject-matter of deontic logic is quite complex. It includes defeasible norms, counterfactual norms, normative rules, multiagent norms, etc. For the purposes of the present presentation I will leave as much as possible of this complexity aside, and focus on situationist deontic logic, i.e.
the deontic logic of that fraction of normative discourse which refers only to one moral appraisal of one situation. No changes in the situation or shifts in the perspective are allowed (which excludes deontic counterfactuals), and no general deontic statements (such as rules) will be represented. Furthermore, I will assume that obligations refer to actions (or omissions), so that p in Op is a sentence that represents an action. (For simple reference I will use "action" and as a short term for "action-representing sentence".)
Basing deontic logic more directly on preferences
I propose that we base deontic logic on preferences, but not in the indirect way shown in Diagrams 2-3. Instead of using a preference relation on (holistic) alternatives, we can apply a preference relation directly to the actions that are the actual objects of obligations and permisssions, as in Diagram 4. Clearly, preferences over actions can in their turn be based on preferences over holistic alternatives. To begin with, however, I will make no such assumption but take the preference relation over actions to be Can we insert normative predicates into a preference structure in the same way that we can insert a monadic predicate such as "best" or "bad"?
To pursue this possibility, consider the following two classes of value predicates that can be inserted into a preference structure:
A monadic predicate H is ≥-positive if and only if for all p and q:
It is ≥-negative if and only if for all p and q:
Among the positive predicates we find such value predicates as "good", "best", "not worst", "very good", "excellent", "not very bad", "acceptable", etc. If one of these predicates holds for p, then it also holds for everything that is better than p or equal in value to p. Among the negative predicates we find "bad", "very bad", "worst", and "not best". If one of these predicates holds for p, then it also holds for everything that is worse than p or equal in value to p.
An obvious option for a semantics of "ought" is to construct it as a positive predicate:
The positivity thesis:
Prescriptive predicates satisfy positivity.
One advantage of this approach is that it allows us to insert several prescriptive predicates of different strengths. This is useful since both our prescriptions and our prescriptive expressions differ in strength; "must" is more stringent than "ought", and "ought" is more stringent than "should".
Unfortunately, however, this simple construction is not at all plausible.
There are at least two classes of counterexamples that can be used against it.
The first class of counterexamples follows the recipe: Let p represent something morally required, and q a supererogatory variant of p.
Concretely, let p denote that you return a borrowed motorcar in time to its owner and q that you return it in time to its owner after first having washed it and filled the petrol tank. It is quite plausible to value q higher than p but nevertheless maintain that p but not q is morally required.
In the other class of counterexamples, the recipe is as follows: Let p represent something morally required, and q a variant of p that is specified in some morally irrelevant way. Concretely, let p denote that I visit my sick aunt, and q that I do this, entering her flat with my left foot first. Then p and q have equal value, but nevertheless p but not q has obligatory status, contrary to the positivity thesis.
Fortunately, there is an alternative to the positivity thesis. To introduce it we need the following definition: A (monadic) predicate H is ≥-contranegative if and only if for all p and q:
My proposal is to base the semantics of deontic logic on the semantic principle that prescriptive predicates are contranegative. Hence, if you ought to work hard, and it is worse to be drunk than not to work hard, then you ought not to be drunk:
The contranegativity thesis: (1) O satisfies ≥-contranegativity,
(2) P satisfies ≥-positivity, and (3) F satisfies ≥-negativity.
PROOF: Left to the reader.
Hence, the contranegativity thesis supports the idea that what is better than something permitted is itself permitted, and that what is worse than something forbidden is itself forbidden. The contranegativity thesis cannot be proved, but it can be corroborated by examples and by the lack of counterexamples. I propose that we accept it on a preliminary basis, or at least as a hypothesis to be tested. The ultimate criterion for its acceptability should of course be whether or not a plausible deontic logic can be based on it. In particular, can the well-known counter-intuitive results in SDL be avoided in a deontic logic that satisfies contranegativity? In order to answer this question, we need to investigate the logical properties of contranegative predicates.
General results for contranegative predicates
It turns out that important properties of contranegative predicates correspond closely to properties of the preference relation on which they are based. The following theorem summarizes some major results.
THEOREM 1: A transitive and complete relation ≥ satisfies
The deontic properties listed in (a), (b), and (c) are more plausible than most other deontic postulates, and they are also closely related. To see their 10 Obviously, for the corresponding permissive predicate P. 
The following property of a preference relation:
is quite plausible. It says that p∨q is intermediate in value between p and q.
The following observation provides us with two alternative formulations of this property:
OBSERVATION 3: Let ≥ be a transitive and complete relation.
Then it satisfies disjunctive interpolation:
(1) iff it satisfies (p≥(p∨q)≥q) ∨ (q≥(p∨q)≥p), and 11 It is also worth noting that if ≥ satisifies (p∨q≥p) ∨ (p∨q≥q), then it satisfies (p≥(p&q)) ∨ (p≥(p&¬q)). This can be shown by substituting p&q for p and p&¬q for q.
(2) iff it satisfies both (p≥(p∨q)) ∨ (q≥(p∨q)) and ((p∨q)≥p) ∨ ((p∨q)≥q)
The two properties of ≥ referred to in part (2) of Observation 3 coincide with the two properties used in parts (a) and (b) 
Reintroducing holistic semantics
In order to obtain a more credible semantic basis for our deontic logic, it will be useful to try to reintroduce holistic alternatives, and use a preference relation (denoted ≥) on them to derive the preference relation on actions that we use as the direct base of the deontic logic. See Diagram 5, and note that no intermediate selection among the holistic alternatives (as in Diagrams 2-3) is used. The idea behind this construction is of course that the normative appraisal of actions should cohere with some reasonable appraisal of the holistic alternatives in which these actions may appear.
I will focus on extremal preference relations. In the present context, this means that the value of an action is completely determined by the values of the best and the worst holistic alternatives that include this action.
More precisely, for each action p, let max(p) be the ≥-best alternative in which p is included (or one of them, if there are several of them). Similarly, let min(p) be the ≥-worst alternative in which p is included. We can then define the following extremal preferences:
Maximin preferences: p≥ i q iff min(p)≥min(q)
Maximax preferences: p≥ x q iff max(p)≥max(q)
Interval maximin preferences: p≥ ix q iff either min(p)>min(q) or both min(p)≡min(q) and max(p)≥max(q)
Interval maximax preferences: p≥ xi q iff either max(p)>max(q) or both max(p)≡max(q) and min(p)≥min(q)
Doubly maximizing preferences p≥ ‡ q iff max(p)≥max(q) and min(p)≥min(q)
Two of these preference relations, namely maximin and maximax preferences, are well-known. They can be said to represent extremely cautious respectively extremely risk-taking decision-making. It has not always been appreciated how extreme the maximin rule is. It requires, for instance, that one be indifferent between owning a valueless piece of paper and owning a ticket in a two-ticket lottery in which the winner will receive ¤1000000 and the loser will receive nothing. The interval maximin rule is a modification of the maximin rule that avoids such extreme results. This rule maximizes both worst and best alternatives, but gives maximization of the former absolute priority over maximization of the latter. Similarly, interval maximax preference relations maximize both worst and best alternatives, but give maximization of the latter absolute priority over maximization of the former. The doubly maximizing preference relation requires maximization of both maximum and minimum, at the price of not being a complete relation.
Although the interval maximin and interval maximax preference relations mitigate the rather strict principles of maximin and maximax preference relations, respectively, they do so only to a limited degree. It is therefore also of interest to study a wider category of extremal preferences that allows for all assignments of relative priorities to maximization of the best and of the worst alternatives. This can be done as follows:
(1) v is a function that assigns a real number to each (holistic) alternative.
(2) v MAX (p) is the highest value of of any alternative that includes p, and v MIN (p) the lowest value of any alternative that includes p. 
Representation theorems
Elsewhere I have reported a series of representation theorems for contranegative deontic logics that are based on the types of preference relations introduced in the previous section.
15 These theorems make use of a series of background assumptions, primarily that the action-representing sentences can be divided into a finite number of equivalence classes with respect to logical equivalence, and also some conditions relating to the 15 Hansson 2001, pp. 161-164. limiting cases of tautologous and contradictory action-representing sentences. Leaving aside these details, the representation theorems are as follows:
Maximin preferences:
O is ≥ i -contranegative iff it satisfies 
Maximax preferences:
O is ≥ x -contranegative iff it satisfies
There is some p such that Op. (non-emptiness)
Interval maximin preferences:
O is ≥ ix -contranegative iff it satisfies
If k r→s, k s→p, and k p→q, and ¬Or, Os and ¬Op, then ¬Oq.
Interval maximax preferences:
O is ≥ xi -contranegative iff it satisfies 
Doubly maximizing preferences:
O is ≥ ‡ -contranegative iff it satisfies:
There is some p such that Op.
Max-min weighted preferences
O is ≥ E -contranegative (with 0<δ<1) iff it satisifes: F(p∨r) , ¬F(p∨s), and ¬F(q∨r), then ¬F(q∨s).
(iv) If P + p, P + q, P(p∨r), ¬P(p∨s), and ¬P(q∨r), then ¬P(q∨s).
where:
for all t such that p&t is consistent.
The proofs can be found in Hansson (2001) except the proof of part 5, that is given in Appendix 2.
The ≥ x -, ≥ i -, and ≥ ix -based operators all satisfy clearly implausible postulates (necessitation, reverse necessitation, and O ⊥ ). The other three types of deontic operators come out better, but unfortunately each of these characterizations makes use of postulates that are unsatisfactorily complex and difficult to grasp. Therefore, although some progress has been made in the construction of a plausible semantics for a deontic logic based on contranegativity, it still remains to develop a plausible semantic structure that has the simplicity of SDL but not its implausible consequences. 
Appendix 1
Appendix 2
The following is a proof of the result on doubly maximizing preferences referred to in section 5. (1) O is a sentence-limited contranegative predicate with respect to a doubly maximizing preference relation, and it holds for the sentence limit f that max(f) is non-maximal.
(2) O satisfies the postulates 
A\B´.
Let A be the set of maximal consistent subsets of the language. We are going to construct a preference relation ≥ on A with the strict part > ("better than") and the symmetric part ≡ ("equal in value to"). Let A 1 = {X 
